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Abstract
Modern cellular networks are witnessing an unprecedented evolution from classical, centralized
and homogenous architectures into a mix of various technologies, in which the network devices are
densely and randomly deployed in a decentralized and heterogenous architecture. This shift in network
architecture requires network devices to become more autonomous and, potentially, cooperate with one
another. Such cooperation can, for example, take place between interfering small access points that seek
to coordinate their radio resource allocation, nearby single-antenna users that can cooperatively perform
virtual MIMO communications, or even unlicensed users that wish to cooperatively sense the spectrum
of the licensed users. Such cooperative mechanisms involve the simultaneous sharing and distribution
of resources among a number of overlapping cooperative groups or coalitions. In this paper, a novel
mathematical framework from cooperative games, dubbed overlapping coalition formation games (OCF
games), is introduced to model and solve such cooperative scenarios. First, the concepts of OCF games
are presented, and then, several algorithmic aspects are studied for two main classes of OCF games.
Subsequently, two example applications, namely, interference management and cooperative spectrum
sensing, are discussed in detail to show how the proposed models and algorithms can be used in the
future scenarios of wireless systems. Finally, we conclude by providing an overview on future directions
and applications of OCF games.
This research was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Grants CNS-1460316 and AST-1506297, NSF
CCF-1456921, Grant CNS-1443917, Grant ECCS-1405121, and Grant NSFC 61428101.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Recent studies show that, driven by emergence of highly capable devices such as smartphones
and resource demanding wireless services such as video streaming, the demand for wireless
capacity will increase roughly 1000x, compared to the current 4G networks, by the year 2020 [1].
In order to overcome this wireless capacity crunch, an evolutionary architecture has been intro-
duced in the next-generation 5G networks, in which low-cost and lower-power small cell base
stations (SBSs) are densely and randomly deployed within the coverage of macrocell base stations
(MBSs) [2] and [3]. This new architecture has shown its great potential to improve the capacity
and coverage of wireless cellular systems. However, such extreme network densification makes it
challenging to manage the cellular system at various levels that include interference control, cov-
erage optimization, load balancing, mobility robustness optimization, and energy management.
Many of the existing solutions require autonomous cooperation between network devices. For
example, SBSs can cooperate for performing coordinated multipoint (CoMP) transmissions [4]
or for coordinating their interference via techniques such as interference alignment [5]. Similarly,
user cooperation can take place in order to further exploit user diversity, e.g., user devices can
relay for each other by using device-to-device (D2D) communications [6], or form cooperative
groups to support virtual multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) [7] transmissions.
Despite in emerging wireless networks, most existing optimization techniques are restricted
to addressing the cooperation problem for centralized and homogenous wireless systems in
which cooperation is a privilege rather than a necessity. In order to provide a more flexible
framework for the cooperative behaviors of future wireless systems, each device in the network
can be treated as an individual decision maker that act on its own principles, which naturally
leads to game-theoretic approaches where multiple players form a stable and efficient network
operating point in a self-organizing manner [8]. In particular, the framework of cooperative game
theory provides the necessary tools for modeling and developing self-organizing techniques for
forming cooperative groups or coalitions between network devices, based on the mutual benefit
and costs for cooperation. Indeed, cooperative games, in general, and coalition formation games
(CF games), in particular, have become a popular tool for analyzing wireless networks [9]–[18].
In [10], single antenna users self-organize into multiple coalitions and share their antennas
in each coalition to form a virtual MIMO system, and hence benefit from spatial diversity
3or multiplexing. In [11], secondary users (SUs) form multiple coalitions and combine their
individual sensing data at the coalition head to perform cooperative spectrum sensing, and hence
improve their sensing performance. In [12], wireless transmitters form coalitions to coordinate
their transmissions so as to improve their physical layer security. In [13], coalition games have
been used to overcome the curse of boundary nodes, in which boundary nodes use cooperative
transmissions to help the backbone nodes in the middle of the network. In [14], hedonic coalition
formation games are utilized to model the task allocations problem, in which a number of
wireless agents are required to collect data from several arbitrarily located tasks using wireless
transmissions. In [15], a coalition formation scheme is proposed for road-side units in vehicular
networks to improve the diversity of the information circulating in the network while exploiting
the underlying content-sharing vehicle-to-vehicle communication network. In [16], a cooperative
model based on coalition formation game is proposed to enable femtocells to improve their
performance by sharing spectral resources, minimizing the number of collisions, and maximizing
the spatial reuse. In [17], coalition formation games are utilized to strike a balance between the
QoS provisioning and the energy efficiency in a clustered wireless sensor network. However,
most of this existing body of work focuses on coalition formation models in which the players
form separate coalitions and get payoffs from the single coalition they join. In future wireless
systems, communication nodes are equipped with more powerful devices that are able to utilize
multiple resources in a more flexible way. This makes it possible and necessary to allow nodes
to participate in multiple overlapping coalitions, and, subsequently, receive payoffs from all
coalitions they participate [19]–[22]. For example, a multiple antenna user may join multiple
coalitions by devoting its antennas into different groups of users, and benefit from multiple virtual
MIMO transmissions, and also, an SBS with multiple neighboring SBSs needs to coordinate its
transmissions with multiple groups of SBSs, so as to avoid inner-channel interferences from all
its neighbors. In these scenarios, the coalitions formed by communication nodes are overlapping,
and each node receives payoffs from the multiple coalitions it joins. Even though there are many
other available modeling tools for analyzing cooperation in wireless networks [32], we focus on
the methods that belong to cooperative game theory.
The main contribution of this paper is to present an introduction to a novel mathematical
framework from cooperative games, overlapping coalition formation games (OCF games), which
provides the necessary analytical tools for analyzing how players in a wireless network can coop-
4erate by joining, simultaneously, multiple overlapping coalitions [29]–[31]. First, in Section II, we
introduce the basic concepts of OCF games in general, and develop two polynomial algorithms
for two classes of OCF games. Then, in Sections III and IV, based on [19] and [20], we present
two emerging applications of OCF games in small cell-based heterogeneous networks (HetNets)
and cognitive radio networks, in order to show the advantages of forming overlapping coalitions
compared with the traditional non-overlapping coalitional games. In Section V, we conclude by
summarizing the potential applications of OCF games in future wireless networks.
II. COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH OVERLAPPING COALITIONS
In this section, we formally introduce the notion of cooperative games with overlapping
coalitions, or OCF games. In Section II. A, we present the basic model of OCF games and
illustrate the overlapping gain compared to traditional cooperative games with non-overlapping
coalitions. In Section II. B, we focus on one key stability notion in OCF games, A-core, which
is a direct extension of the core from traditional cooperative games. In this regard, we show that
the computation of “stable” outcomes in the sense of the A-core can generally be intractable.
Therefore, in Section II. C, we identify several constraints that lead to tractable subclasses of
OCF games, and provide efficient algorithms for solving games that fall under these subclasses.
A. Basic Concepts
Game theory is a mathematical tool that analyzes systems with multiple decision makers
having interdependent objectives and actions. The decision makers, which are usually referred
to as players, will interact and obtain individual profits from the resulting outcome. In cooperative
games, the players can form cooperative groups, or coalitions, to jointly increase their profits
in a game. In traditional cooperative games, the players are typically assumed to form disjoint,
non-overlapping coalitions, and they only cooperate with players within the same coalition.
However, there are situations in which some players may be involved in multiple coalitions
simultaneously. In such cases, these players may need to split their resources among the coalitions
that they participate in. For example, a multi-mode wireless terminal may access base stations
from different networks and it needs to distribute its traffic load among these networks [22].
In such situations, some coalitions (cells of different systems) may involve some of the same
players (multi-mode terminals), and therefore may overlap with one another. Now, we formally
5introduce the mathematical tool to model these “overlapping” situations, cooperative games with
overlapping coalitions, or OCF games.
In OCF games, each player possesses a certain amount of resources such as time, power or
money. In order to obtain individual profits, the players form coalitions by contributing a portion
of their resources and receive payoffs from the devoted coalitions. A coalition can be represented
by the resource vector contributed by its coalition members, i.e., r = (r1, r2, . . . , rN), where
0 < ri < R represents player i’s resources that are contributed to this coalition. For each coalition
r, the coalition value is decided by a function v : [0, R]N → R+, which represents the total
payoff that the players can get from a cooperative coalition. The coalition value can be divided
to the coalition members based on specific rules, e.g. the value can be equally divided among
coalition members, or it can be divided based on the contribution of each member. We denote by
x as the payoff allocation rule, and accordingly, the individual payoff that player i receives from
coalition r is denoted by xi(r). The players may decide to devote different amount of resources
into different coalitions, so as to maximize its individual payoff pi(pi,x) =
∑
r∈pi xi(r), where
pi represents the set of all coalitions pi = {r1, r2, . . . , rK} formed by the players. Note that these
coalitions may have common members, and thus, they form an overlapping coalition structure.
Compared with the traditional CF games, OCF games allow the players to form an overlapping
coalition structure and get payoffs from multiple coalitions. Therefore, the overlapping structure
may provide more flexibility for the players to utilize their resources, which enables the coalitions
to be better organized and potentially leads to outcomes with higher payoffs. The following
example clearly shows the potential advantage of OCF games.
Example: Consider a software company with three developers A,B and C. Each developer
works 8 hours a day. There are two types of projects in the company, big projects and small
projects. A big project requires 12 man-hours per day and provides a 2400 bonus, and a small
project requires 8 man-hours per day and provides a 1000 bonus. We assume the bonus is divided
to the participating developers according to their devoted time. In a traditional CF game, the
players can only form disjoint coalitions, and the optimal coalition structure is {{A,B}, {C}},
as seen in Fig. 1(a), i.e., developers A and B work together to accomplish a big project and
developer C work alone for a small project. The total payoffs of A,B and C are then given by
(1200, 1200, 1000). In an OCF game, the players can split their time into different coalitions,
and the optimal coalition structure is {(8, 4, 0), (0, 4, 8)}, as seen in Fig. 1(b), i.e., developers
6      Time   Bonus (Big)
A    8h       1200
B    8h       1200
      Time   Bonus (Small)
C    8h       1000
A B C
(a) the CF game model
      Time   Bonus (Big)
A    8h       1600
B    4h       800
      Time   Bonus (Big)
C    8h       1600
B    4h       800
A B C
(b) the OCF game model
Fig. 1. An example to show the differences between OCF games and traditional CF games.
A and B devote 8 and 4 hours to accomplish a big project, and developers B and C devote 4
and 8 hours to accomplish another big project. The payoffs of A,B and C are then given by
(1600, 1600, 1600).
B. Stability Notions
In cooperative games, one must seek a stable outcome, i.e., a coalition structure in which no
set of players can deviate and obtain a new structure that increases all their payoffs [9], [31].
In traditional CF games, the deviating players, or deviators, leave their original coalitions and
form a new coalition, the value of which is the total payoff that the deviators can get from
their deviation. If there exists a payoff division that makes all the deviators achieve a higher
payoff compared with the original coalition structure, we say the deviation is profitable. If there
exists no profitable deviation, we say the structure is stable. Particularly, if the players have an
incentive to form the grand coalition that includes all players, the cooperative game is called a
canonical game and the set of all stable payoff divisions, corresponding the grand coalition, is
called the core of such a game.
Compared with CF games, defining notions for stability in OCF games is more complicated
due to the overlapping property. In OCF games, instead of forming a single coalition, the deviators
may form multiple coalitions that overlap one another thus complicating the computation of the
maximal total payoff of such an overlapping coalition structure. Also, the deviators in OCF games
may partially deviate from the original coalitions by withdrawing a portion of their resources
while maintaining their other resources in their original coalitions. Therefore, one must precisely
7define how the non-deviators in the original coalitions will react to such a deviation and how
much payoff the deviators can get from those partially deviated coalitions. To this end, we now
present the A-core, a stability notion suitable for OCF games, which is an extension of the core
notion from traditional CF games.
We begin by defining a deviation in OCF games. Given a coalition structure pi and a set
of players S that attempts to deviate the structure, the coalitions in pi can be divided into two
groups: the coalitions that only involve players in S, denoted by pi|S , and the coalitions that
involves players other than S, given by pi\pi|S . Since coalitions pi|S are fully controlled by the
deviators, they should be seen as pure resources withdrawn by the deviators. While coalitions
pi\pi|S , which include both deviators and non-deviators, should be considered as coalitions that
are partially deviated by the deviators. We define D(pi) = {d(r)|r ∈ pi\pi|S} as the resources
withdrawn from pi\pi|S , where d(r) is the resources that S withdraw from coalition r.
The deviators S can form an overlapping coalition structure using both the withdrawn re-
sources D(pi), and the resources of their own pi|S . We denote by W S as the sum available
resources of the deviators S, and Π(W S) as the set of all possible coalition structures that
can be formed using W S . The optimal coalition structure formed by S is then given by
pi(W S) = argmaxpi∈Π(W S)
{∑
r∈pi v(r)
}
. Note that the deviators may also receive payoffs
from the coalitions that they partially deviate, i.e., pi\pi|S . We formally define the arbitration
function Ar(pi,x, D(pi),S), which represents the total payoff that the deviators S will receive
from coalition r ∈ pi\pi|S .
Definition 1: A deviation on a player set S is said to be A-profitable if and only if
∑
i∈S
pi(pi,x) <
∑
r∈pi(W S)
v(r) +
∑
r∈pi\pi|S
Ar(pi,x, D(pi),S). (1)
If there exists no A-profitable deviation for any player set, then the coalition structure pi is said
to be in the A-core, or A-stable.
The coalition structures in A-core represent the stable structures in which no set of players
have the motivation to deviate from the current structure. We note that the definition of A-core
depends on the specific form of the arbitration function. According to different assumptions
on players and different applicable scenarios [29], [31], three of the mostly used arbitration
functions are described as follows:
1) c-core: if the players are very conservative in cooperating with deviators, the deviators may
8receive no payoffs from any original coalitions in pi\pi|S , even if they still contribute to
these coalitions, i.e., Ar(pi,x, D(pi),S) ≡ 0. This is called the conservative arbitration
function, and the stability notion is referred to as c-core.
2) r-core: if the players are more lenient, the deviators can still get their original payoffs
from the coalitions that are not influenced by their deviation, i.e., Ar(pi,x, D(pi),S) =
∑
i∈S xi(r) for all coalition r with d(r) = 0. This is called the refined arbitration function,
and the stability notion is referred to as r-core.
3) o-core: the players can be highly generous that they allow the deviators to keep all the “left-
over” payoff as long as the non-deviators’ original payoffs are ensured to be unchanged, i.e.,
Ar(pi,x, D(pi),S) = v(r−d(r))−
∑
i∈N\S xi(r). This is called the optimistic arbitration
function, and the stability notion is referred to as o-core.
Hereinafter, we adopt the o-core as the stability notion due to its computational advantage that
we will explain in the next subsection.
C. Algorithms for o-Stable Outcomes
To avoid the difficulty in representing the value function v and the arbitration function A, we
assume that the resources are given by integers such that R ∈ Z+ and the players can only divide
their resources in a discrete manner. Such games are referred to as discrete OCF games and they
apply to practical systems. Also, due to the cost of information exchange between deviators, we
assume the number of deviators in a deviation is preliminarily bounded. We denote by S as
the upper bound of deviation size, i.e., |S| ≤ S for any deviation on any player set S. It has
been shown that computing an A-stable outcome of an OCF game is generally a challenging
problem [31]. However, if we only consider the o-core notion and identify several constraints
on the game, there exists efficient algorithms that lead to o-stable outcomes of such games.
Proposition 1: Any o-profitable deviation on any player set S ⊆ N will increase the social
welfare, which is defined as the total value of all coalitions in the outcome, i.e., ∑
r∈pi v(r).
Proof: The social welfare can be written as SW = ∑
r∈pi\pi|S
v(r) +
∑
r∈pi|S
v(r), where
the first item represents the sum value of pi\pi|S , and the second item represents the sum value
of pi|S . After the deviation of S, the deviators withdraw d(r) resources from each coalition
r ∈ pi\pi|S , and the coalition is reduced to r−d(r). Meanwhile, the deviators form an optimal
coalition structure pi(W S). Therefore, the social welfare after deviation is given by SW ′ =
9∑
r∈pi\pi|S
v(r − d(r)) +
∑
r∈pi(W S)
v(r). According to the definition of o-core, we can easily
prove that the social welfare is increased by the deviation on S, i.e., SW ′ > SW . Therefore,
we conclude that any o-profitable deviation will increase the social welfare.
In most practical problems, the social welfare is bounded due to the limited resources. For
such games, Proposition 1 implies that the game must converge to an o-stable outcome after finite
o-profitable deviations. Therefore, we can compute an o-stable outcome by iteratively computing
an o-profitable deviation to the current outcome. However, finding an o-profitable deviation is
a challenging problem. First, without further restrictions on deviations, the number of potential
deviations can be extremely large. Second, deciding whether a deviation is o-profitable requires
solving the optimal coalition structure problem, which is not a straightforward problem. Now, we
define two subclasses of OCF games, namely K-coalition OCF games and K-task OCF games,
and we provide efficient algorithms to compute o-stable outcomes in such games, respectively.
In a K-coalition OCF game, we assume each player can contribute to at most K coali-
tions. This assumption is reasonable in many practical systems due to geographical constraints,
communication cost, or lack of information. For example, a mobile user can only connect
to limited base stations that are close to it. Therefore, for a group of deviators S in a K-
coalition game, the number of possible deviations is bounded by (R + 1)SK . Since there are
CS
N
groups of possible deviators, the total number of possible deviations is then bounded by
CS
N
(R + 1)SK = O(NS), which is polynomial in N . For any deviation on S, the deviators
need to calculate the optimal coalition structure pi(W S) to decide whether the deviation is o-
profitable. We define the superadditive cover of v to be the function v∗ : [0, R]N → R+, such
that v∗(W ) = maxpi∈Π(W )
{∑
r∈pi v(r)
}
for any resource vector W . Briefly, v∗(W ) is the
maximal total value that the players can generate by forming overlapping coalitions when their
total resources are given by W . We observe that v∗(W ) = max {v∗(W − r) + v(r)|r 4W },
which is a recurrence relation for a discrete-time dynamic system. Thus, we can use the dynamic
programming algorithm to calculate v∗(W ). Given the values of v∗(W ′) for all W ′ 4W , the
computation of v∗(W ) requires (R+1)S times of computing v. Therefore, the entire computation
of v∗(W ) requires at most (R + 1)S(R + 1)S = (R + 1)2S times of computing v. When
v∗(W ) is calculated, we can trace backward the optimal path and achieve every coalition in
the optimal coalition structure pi(W ). Therefore, the optimal coalition structure pi(W S) can
be calculated in time (R + 1)2S . Therefore, we can calculate an o-profitable deviation in time
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TABLE I
ALGORITHM FOR K-COALITION GAMES
Input an initial outcome (pi0,x0).
1: pi ← pi0 % initial coalition structure
2: x← x0 % initial payoffs
3: while there exists an o-profitable deviation on a player set S do
4: (r − d(r))← r for all r ∈ pi\pi|S
5: pi(W S)← pi|S
6: decide new payoffs x
7: end while
8: pif ← pi % final coalitional structure
9: xf ← x % final payoffs
Output an o-stable outcome (pif ,xf ).
CS
N
(R+1)SK(R+1)2S = CS
N
(R+1)S(K+2) = O(NS), which is polynomial in N . The algorithm
for K-coalition games is shown in Table I.
In a K-task OCF game, each coalition in the game corresponds to a specific task and each
player can only contribute to K tasks. Being different from K-coalition OCF games, the number
of coalitions in a K-task OCF game is strictly limited by the number of tasks, which are
predetermined by the considered problem. For example, in a software company, the available
projects are predetermined and the developers cannot form coalitions to generate new projects but
only divide his time among the existing ones. Since the number of coalitions is fixed in a K-task
OCF game, a deviation will not form new coalition structures but only move resources among
the existing coalitions, and thus, we refer to deviation as transfer in K-task OCF games. The
number of possible transfers is now given by CS
N
[K2(R+1)]S = O(NS), which is polynomial in
N . Since the deviators do not form an overlapping coalition structure, their payoffs can be easily
calculated using the arbitration function. Therefore, an o-profitable deviation of a K-task OCF
game can be calculated in time O(NS). The algorithm for K-task games is shown in Table II.
Given the polynomial algorithms for K-coalition games and K-task games, we then provide
two example applications to show how the concepts and algorithms of OCF games can be utilized
in wireless networks. Note that we restrict our model to single-resource scenarios in which the
players only have one type of resources. However, this model can be extended to the multi-
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TABLE II
ALGORITHM FOR K-TASK GAMES
Input an initial outcome (pi0,x0).
1: pi ← pi0 % initial coalition structure
2: x← x0 % initial payoffs
3: while there exists an o-profitable transfer on a player set S do
4: (r − d(r))← r for all r ∈ pi
5: decide new payoffs x
6: end while
7: pif ← pi % final coalitional structure
8: xf ← x % final payoffs
Output an o-stable outcome (pif ,xf ).
resource setting, by using a vector rather than a scalar to describe the contribution of a player,
and all the concepts and algorithms can also be extended to such a case.
III. APPLICATION SCENARIO I: INTERFERENCE MANAGEMENT IN HETNETS
In small cell-based HetNets, a large number of small cells may be randomly deployed in
the same spectrum as the existing, macro-cellular network. Due to the large amount of small
cells and their ad hoc nature of deployment, interference management is always one of the
key challenges in HetNets [23]. There are many interference management techniques, such as
successive interference cancellation (SIC), parallel interference cancellation (PIC) and multiuser
detection (MUD) [24]. However, these techniques require global knowledge of the characteristics
of the interfering channels, which generates a huge amount of backhaul traffic for small cells
and makes it impractical when the number of small cells is large. In this case, distributed
schemes become important, where no central controller is involved in the system and minimum
information exchange is required among the small base stations [25].
Game theory, due to its self-organizing characteristic, has also been widely utilized to design
distributed approaches for interference management [26]. However, most of these approaches
are based on non-cooperative games where no information exchange is allowed among small
cells. In this paper, we propose a cooperative approach based on OCF games. We consider the
downlink scenario in which the macro users are interfered by nearby SBSs, and small cell users
12
Small cell
Macro cell
Small cell
Macro cell users
Available RBs for small cells 
Fig. 2. Application scenario I: radio resource allocation in HetNets
are interfered by MBSs as well as nearby SBSs. To avoid interference between the macro network
and small cells, the underlayed MBS can inform each SBS in coverage of the available RBs
in the current slot, which is determined by the radio assignment of the macro users. However,
interference between small cells still exists due to the lack of coordination between SBSs. This
scenario is illustrated in Fig. 2. We will study how OCF games can be used to coordinate the
interference between SBSs and improve the entire network performance [19].
For each SBS, the available RBs, which are decided by the MBS that covers it, are the
resources that can be used to cooperate with other SBSs. For each available RB, the SBS can
decide to leave it unoccupied so as to reduce the inter-cell interference, or to utilize it for
downlink transmissions so as to improve the throughput. When the SBSs cooperate with each
other by contributing a part of their available RBs, they form a coalition in which all contributed
RBs are evenly distributed to the involved SBSs. To avoid interference inside the coalition, each
RB can only be distributed to one SBS, and the SBSs can only utilize the RBs distributed
to them. The value of a coalition is given by the total downlink throughput generated by the
resources of this coalition. Note that the interference outside the coalition still exists and it
13
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Fig. 3. The total throughput as a function of the number of SBSs in a 400× 400 m2 area with different levels of traffic load.
The interference radius of each SBS is set as 100 m.
should be considered in the calculation of coalition value. The value is then distributed to the
involved SBSs as their payoffs when they actually use them in the downlink transmission. In
order maximize their individual payoffs, the SBSs may form different overlapping coalitions
by deviating from the current overlapping coalition structure. The dynamics can be seen as an
OCF-game, which converges to an o-stable structure as we explained. Since the coalitions can
only be formed by neighboring SBSs, the number of coalitions that a SBS can participate is
limited. Therefore, the studied OCF game is a K-coalition OCF game. We use the developed
algorithm in Table I and the performance is shown in Fig. 3.
In Fig. 3, we compare the developed algorithm with the situation of no overlapping in networks
with different levels of traffic load. The values 50% and 75% represent the average rate between
the number of required RBs by small cell users and the total available RBs for SBSs. When
the SBSs are sparsely deployed, the SBSs seldom interfere each other, and the performance
improvement by the developed algorithm is limited. As more SBSs are deployed in the area, the
interference coordination becomes crucial and the developed algorithm improves the network
performance by 20% to 40%. When the SBSs are extremely dense, the inevitable interference
between the coalitions dominates the network performance, and the advantage of the developed
algorithm converges to zero. Also, when the traffic load is heavier, interference coordination can
14
p3
SU 1
Primary user
SU 2
SU 3
Sensing channel
Reporting 
channel
P1, P3 -> Q1
P2, P1 -> Q2
P3, P2 -> Q3
               Observations: yi
            Local decisions: pi
Cooperative decisions: Qi
Fig. 4. Application scenario II: cooperative sensing
bring more benefits to the network, and thus, the developed algorithm performs better.
IV. APPLICATION SCENARIO II: COOPERATIVE SENSING
In order to provide gigabit transmission rate, future wireless networks must use a large amount
of spectrum resources. However, the scarcity of the radio spectrum coupled with the existing,
fixed spectrum assignment policies, has motivated the need for new, dynamic spectrum access
mechanisms to efficiently exploit the spectral resources. Cognitive radio (CR) is one highly
promising technique to achieve such dynamic exploitation of the radio spectrum. In CR networks,
unlicensed, secondary users (SUs), can sense the environment and change their parameters to
access the spectrum of licensed, primary users (PUs), while maintaining the interference to
the PUs below a tolerable threshold. Such spectrum sensing is an integral part of any CR
network. Indeed, reaping the benefit of CR is contingent upon deploying smart and efficient
spectrum sensing policies. Here, we consider the cooperative sensing scheme, in which nearby
SUs exchange their local sensing results and then make collaborative decisions on the detection of
PUs. There are three categories of cooperative spectrum sensing, based on how cooperating SUs
share their sensing data in the network: centralized, distributed, and relay-assisted [27]. Here,
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we consider the distributed case, where SUs communicate among themselves with no fusion
center or relay, as seen in Fig. 4. Traditionally, the distributed approach adopts non-cooperative
schemes for its simplicity [28]. In this paper, we will show how OCF games can be used to
introduce cooperation between SUs, and thus, improve the overall sensing performance [20].
Consider a cognitive radio network with multiple SUs equipped with energy detectors and a
single PU far away from them. In this network, the SUs can individually and locally decide on
the presence or absence of the PU via their own detectors. Then, they can cooperate with one
another by exchanging their local decisions via a reporting channel. At last, each SU combines
its local decision with the received decisions and decides whether or not the PU is present. Note
that the SUs may have different local detectors with different detection threshold, their missed
detection probabilities and false alarm probabilities may be different.
In process of cooperative sensing, each SU in the system needs to collect local decisions from
other SUs, and thus, each SU represents a sensing task to be accomplished via the cooperation
of SUs. However, the bandwidth of the report channel is limited for every SU, which is usually
not enough to transmit to all other SUs, especially for those SUs with bad channel conditions.
Thus, a SU needs to decide how to cooperate with other SUs by efficiently allocating its limited
bandwidth to the transmissions of different SUs. Therefore, this is K-task OCF game, where
each task is presented by a coalition composed of a head SU that collects local decisions and
other SUs that report to it. The value of the coalition is then given by the sensing performance of
the head SU, which can be calculated based on the adopted fusion rule. We utilize the developed
algorithm in Table II and show its performance in Fig. 5.
In Fig. 5, we compare the developed algorithm with the local sensing method and the non-
overlapping method. In the local sensing method, the SUs use their local sensing decision
without any information exchange. In the non-overlapping method, the SUs form non-overlapping
coalitions and each SU only share information inside the coalition it joins. Clearly, the developed
algorithm outperforms both methods. The incorrect probability decreases to 1/12 of the local
sensing method and 1/4 of the non-overlapping method. Also, the improvement becomes larger
as the number of SUs increases.
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Fig. 5. Network sensing performance as a function of the number of SUs.
V. OTHER APPLICATIONS
OCF game are quite suitable for modeling the future wireless networks, in which the wireless
nodes are dense, self-organizing, and cooperative. In this section, we briefly discuss other
potential applications of OCF games and then summarize the applications in Table III.
A. Multi-Radio Traffic Offloading
Cellular networks are constantly evolving into their next generation. However, the former
systems are not entirely replaced by the new systems. In fact, it is expected that different
networks will coexist for a long time, and, thus, mobile phones will be multi-mode terminals
that enable communications over different radio access technologies (RATs). In order to fully
explore their network investments, the operators must intelligently offload their network traffic
over different RATs. Developing such offloading schemes, which must consider the demands
and access authorities of different users, the transmitting rates of different technologies, and the
deployment and load of different base stations, is quite challenging for a large number of users
and base stations. However, one can use the proposed K-task OCF game to model this problem.
In the OCF game model, the mobile users can distribute their traffic into different base stations
17
TABLE III
APPLICATIONS OF OCF GAMES
Application Player Resources Coalition Coalition Value Type
Radio resource
allocation
Small cells
Available
RBs
Radio coordination among
the RBs from different
small cells
Total throughput of the coordi-
nated RBs considering all the
potential interference
K-coalition
Cooperative
spectrum sensing
SUs
Signaling
bits
A specific SU and the SUs
that report to this SU
the cooperative sensing per-
formance of this specific sec-
ondary user
K-task
Multi-radio traf-
fic offloading
Multi-
mode
devices
User traffic
A specific base station and
the traffic contributed by
different devices
A function reflecting the user
experience
K-task
CoMP
Base
stations
Radio
resources
A cell-edge user and the re-
sources contributed by dif-
ferent base stations
The throughput of the cell-edge
user
K-task
Virtual MIMO
Mobile
phones
Radio
resources
Cooperative users forming
a virtual MIMO group
the MIMO link rate K-coalition
Smartphone
sensing
Smartphones
Battery en-
ergy
A task and the energy de-
voted by different smart-
phones
The task utility K-task
in different networks. A coalition here represents a base station as well as the traffic devoted
from different mobile users. The coalition value can be simply defined as the total throughput of
this base station with channel and technology limitations, or a sophisticated function reflecting
the user experience, which considers the delay and rate experienced by the users, and the cost
and energy efficiency of the network. Using the developed algorithm in Table II, the user traffic
can be intelligently distributed among different networks with high network performance in the
sense of the defined value function.
B. Cooperative Communications
In order to increase the performance of cell-edge users, coordinated multipoint (CoMP)
transmission has been proposed, in which the signals of multiple base stations are coordinated to
serve a cell-edge user. Since there are multiple cell-edge users, the base stations should allocate
their radio resources among these users. It is a challenging optimization problem, since the
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channel conditions, traffic demands and radio resources are different for different users and base
stations. However, we can model this problem using a K-task OCF game.
In the OCF game model, the base stations can freely allocate their radio resources to different
users, including bandwidth, power and antenna resources. A coalition represents a cell-edge user
as well as the radio resources devoted from different base stations. The coalition value is defined
as the throughput of this cell-edge user. Thus, using the developed algorithm in Table II, the
radio resources of base stations can be efficiently distributed among different cell-edge users.
Another related application is the cooperation between user devices. In order to increase their
transmission rate, nearby users may group together to use virtual MIMO transmissions. The
MIMO link rate is generally increasing with the number of cooperated users, while the marginal
increase is decreasing due to the increasing distance between different users. Thus, a user may
want to allocate its radio resources among different cooperative groups, so as to maximize its
individual throughput. This problem can be modeled via a K-coalition OCF game, in which a
coalition represents a virtual MIMO group and the coalition value is the MIMO link rate. Using
the developed algorithm in Table I, the radio resources of users can be efficiently distributed
among different virtual MIMO groups.
C. Smartphone Sensing
In recent years, smartphones are equipped with more and more sensors. These powerful sensors
allow public departments or commercial companies to accomplish large-area sensing tasks via
individual smartphones. These tasks often require collecting data in a large area, and thus, a
huge number of smartphones may be involved. Based on the task itself and the geographic
locations of smartphones, different tasks may require different amount of energy and provide
different payoffs for different smartphones. A smartphone user must decide to which tasks he
should devote the limited energy. Therefore, we can model this problem with the studied K-task
OCF game, in which each coalition represents a task and the energy devoted from different
smartphones, and the coalition value is given by the task utility. Using the developed algorithm
in Table II, the smartphone users can efficiently allocate their energy into different sensing tasks.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced the framework of overlapping coalition formation games as a
tool to model and analyze the communication scenarios in future networks. In particular, we have
defined two subclasses, namely K-coalition and K-task OCF games, and we have developed
polynomial algorithms to achieve an o-stable outcome. Subsequently, we have presented, in detail,
how OCF games can be used to address challenging problems in two application domains: radio
resource allocation in HetNets and cooperative sensing. In addition, we have discussed some
other potential applications of OCF-games, including multi-radio traffic offloading, cooperative
communications, and smartphone sensing. Finally, we envision that the use of the OCF game
framework will play an important role in 5G networks, particularly, as the network becomes
more dense, decentralized and self-organizing.
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